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RICHARD HOLTON
. INTRODUCTION
It is easy to see addiction as destroying intentional action altogether; easy to see addicts as 
swept away by a welter of compulsive behaviors. But the empirical evidence has increasingly 
indicated that such a picture is not right.2 While addiction does involve plenty of involuntary 
states—most centrally, cue-driven cravings—these do not in themselves amount to behaviour. 
Behaviour comes from the interaction of these involuntary states with more familiar 
deliberative processes. So in trying to understand why addicts act as they do, we need to 
understand these processes, and the beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states that are 
involved.
In this context then, it will matter whether addicts think that it is worth giving up, and 
whether they think that they are able to do so. What information will they have? They will 
doubtless have been told many things. But they will also be observers of their own behaviour, 
hypothesizing about their situation and capacities on the basis of what they have done. Here 
they need not just be passive self-observers. They may be acting partly in order to gain relevant 
information; that is, they may be self-signalling.
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2 The evidence for this is now very strong and can be found in many writings. Kent Berridge and I reviewed some 
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).
Why is self-signalling important in addition? Addicts who are trying to give up typically have 
conflicting motivations: at the same time as wanting to stop, they still want the drugs. 
Resisting the desire for drugs is hard work. That means that it can be easily undermined by any 
consideration that suggests that it not worthwhile, even if the rational credentials of such a 
consideration are slim. In many cases of temptation a failure to resist is underpinned by a  
judgment shift: agents come to think that the tempting object is better, relative to the 
alternatives, than they had thought when they resolved to resist. But simple judgement shift is 
hard to maintain in cases of serious addiction. It is hard for addicts to convince themselves that 
it is genuinely better to persist in their addiction. Self-signalling, I suggest, provides them with 
an alternative story. It is a wonderfully flexible device. If giving up seems to be easy, self-
signalling can be used to provide evidence that they are not addicted and hence do not need to 
give up. If giving up seems to be hard, it can provide evidence that they are so badly addicted 
that giving up is bound to fail. So it is not, I will argue, a very helpful method to employ.
In the next section I will present the central features of self-signalling, and related phenomena, 
stressing the distinction between those cases where it provides good evidence about the state of 
the agent, and those where it is deceptive. In the third I provide a background account of how I 
am understanding addiction. In the fourth section I bring these two together to discuss the 
role of self-signalling in addiction. In the fifth I ask how the corrupting role of self-signalling 
might be escaped.
. SELF-SIGNALLING
This seems like a rather general truth: it is only worth trying to do something if you believe 
that you will succeed. Of course there are exceptions. It may be that you simply need to show, 
whether to yourself or to others, that you have tried. Or it may be that all the other options are 
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so terrible that trying for the remaining one makes perfect sense, even though the odds of 
success are slim; trying is the best of a bad bunch. For the most part though, coming to think 
that you’re going to fail in a task is likely to greatly reduce your motivation to try, an idea that 
has been much developed by psychologists under the banner of ‘self-eﬃcacy’.3
Here though is a complicating factor. Sometimes the information you receive from trying will 
give evidence of how likely you are to succeed. This means that there can be reason to try in the 
absence of belief in success; in fact, there may be reason to try even if you believe you will fail. 
For even if you believe you will fail, you may still be looking for evidence that you will not; and 
trying may be a good way of obtaining such evidence. 
This may appear exotic, but it is part of a very familiar phenomenon that extends beyond just a 
concern with my likely success. Should I go skiing? That rather depends on whether I will 
enjoy it. But I don’t know whether I will. I can imagine a wonderful week revelling in the 
exhilaration of flying down crisp mountain sides. I can also imagine a week of abject terror. 
‘Try it!’ urge my friends; ‘Only then will you know if you like it!‘  If I do it will be my desire for 
knowledge of my preferences—whether I like skiing or not—that will move me. If we think, 
moreover, that I seek such knowledge because I aim to satisfy my preferences, then this too is a 
case of finding out what I can do—how I can have a good time—by trying. 
In the skiing case, the reason to try is increased by the reflection that the knowledge will be 
useful in the long run. If I enjoy the holiday, then, money permitting, a lifetime of winter 
breaks in the mountains beckons. If I don’t, I write it oﬀ as useful experience, and know to 
avoid it in the future. If we only have one shot at something, then this is not relevant. But even 
in the case of the single shot, it is unusual that success will be achieved by a single act. 
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Achieving most ends require some persistence over time; and here the evidence that comes 
from starting the attempt may well aﬀect whether one persists.
In some cases we can imagine that the resulting evidence will bolster the attempt. If I find that 
I manage to get up early every morning for a week to go for a run, that will increase my 
confidence that I am able to keep the schedule, and that it turn will increase my motivation to 
do so. Indeed it may be that simply finding I have the motivation to try is enough to convince 
me that I have the motivation to persevere. And if I believe I am going to persevere, that makes 
each individual run better motivated, since it will gain its point from being part of a virtuous 
pattern.
In other cases though, the experiences will be less conducive to success. Finding how hard the 
attempt is can be seen as evidence that failure is likely. Having failed to run most days this 
week, Friday’s attempt will be poorly motivated. Even if I were to manage it, it might seem 
pointless, since my confidence that it would be part of a worthwhile pattern would be so low.
A third set of cases involve vacillation. These have had plenty of discussion in the philosophical 
literature, though the examples tend to the fantastical. Here is one from Andy Egan.4 Imagine 
a ‘Psychopath Button’: pushing it will kill all psychopaths. Imagine too someone who is 
contemplating pushing it: ‘A world without psychopaths’, they reason, ‘would be a better 
place’. But as they approach the button they hesitate. The thought occurs to them that anyone 
who would do such a thing would be a psychopath. Unwilling to risk self destruction to 
achieve a world without psychopaths, they back oﬀ. But this in turn provides them with 
evidence that they are not a psychopath. So then they are caught in a cycle: as they decide to 
push the button, pushing it seems like a bad idea; as they decide not to, the likelihood that 
they are a psychopath recedes, and it seems like a good idea again. (To rephrase this in terms 
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4 (Egan, ); I have made my subject a little less certain than Egan’s.
of an attempt to gain evidence of what they can achieve, make their goal a world that includes 
them and no (other) psychopaths; the question is whether they can achieve this by pushing the 
button.)
Following recent discussions in economics and psychology, think of all these cases as involving 
the possibility of self-signalling. Sometimes that term is used just to cover epistemically perverse 
behaviour: cases in which agents want to convince themselves of something, whether or not it 
is true.5 I suggest that we should initially cast our gaze more broadly, and then we can turn to 
the perverse cases as a particular application. So I define active self-signalling behaviour as the 
behaviour of agents that is motivated, at least partially, by an aim to obtain evidence about 
some relatively hidden feature of themselves—the target feature as I shall call it. The notion of 
self thus plays a triple role in self-signalling: activity by the self is undertaken to provide 
evidence about the self to the self. (Seen this way we immediately recognize a family of related 
behaviours that we can perform: those that provide evidence about ourselves to others; those 
that provide evidence about others to ourselves; those that provide evidence about others to 
others.) Not all of the behaviours we have looked at are obviously cases of active self-signalling 
in this sense: in the case of the psychopath button, at least initially, our imaginary agent was 
simply motivated by a desire to eliminate psychopaths. Evidence of their own standing came as 
a bonus along the way. Think of this as passive self-signalling. Active and passive can easily 
merge into each other. However, once our agent realizes that evidence is available through 
their behaviour, then further behaviour can be motivated by a desire to obtain such evidence. 
Wanting to know whether they are a psychopath, they look to see how tempted they are to 
push the button.
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5 Bodner and Prelec () define it as ‘an action chosen partly to secure good news about one’s traits or abilities, 
even when the action has no causal impact on these traits and abilities.’
 What then of the perverse cases that have been the focus of much of the discussion? If self-
signalling is going to be accurate, the signal (the behaviour) must be a reliable guide to the 
target feature. This may be because the signal constitutes the target feature; because the target 
feature causes the signal; because the signal causes the target feature; because both have some 
common cause; or perhaps for some other reason. But if the signal is to be a reliable indicator, 
it must not be the case that it would have been equally likely even in the absence of the target 
feature. 
We get perverse cases when the self-signalling involves a signal that is known not to be a 
reliable indicator. Since Weber we have been familiar with the idea that Calvinists, who 
thought that their fate was sealed by God’s prior decree, might nevertheless be motivated to do 
good works by a desire for assurance that they were among the elect. This certainly wasn’t an 
unwarranted imputation on Weber’s part: such ideas were much discussed by th century 
puritans.6 Nevertheless, this behaviour looks as though it may be perverse. The performance of 
good works is under an agent’s control. The elect can perform them; but so can the reprobate. 
That wouldn’t devalue good works as a signal if the elect were more likely to perform them 
than the reprobate. But if the primary motivation to perform good works is to gain the 
reassuring belief that one is among the  elect, and both groups are equally keen on that, then 
performing good works will not be a reliable signal. Strikingly then, it is exactly when 
assurance of election is proposed as a motivation for performing good works that the 
performance of good works loses its eﬃcacy as assurance.7
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7 Oddly, Weber doesn’t seem to be concerned about this tension, perhaps because he takes it that the kind of 
worldly success that bring evidence of election requires cooperation between Man and God—‘God helps those 
who help themselves’ p. —and so could not achieved by the reprobate. At other times though he says that 
fatalism is ‘the only logical consequence of predestination’, whereas ‘the psychological result was precisely the 
opposite’ p. , n. This suggests that the ‘psychological results’ were irrational, though he never says as much.
In the Calvinist case, we might think that those concerned were culpable for their failure to 
realize that the signals they were getting were unreliable. To this extent, their actions were 
irrational. But in other cases things are less clear. If agents don’t know that they are being 
motivated by the desire for a good signal, it doesn’t seem right to accuse them of irrationality. 
Consider a much discussed experiment on self-deception from Quattrone and Tversky (). 
One group of subjects are told that being able to hold their arms for longer in cold water after 
exercise is a sign of a strong heart and a long life; a second group are told that it is a sign of a 
weak heart and a short life. The former tend to keep their arms in the water for longer. Clearly 
this is self-signalling: each group wants good news, and each modifies their behaviour 
accordingly. If they knew what they were doing, they would certainly be irrational. But until 
they see the data they may have no way of knowing that: three quarters claimed that they were 
not trying to influence the outcome. So here it seems more like simple mistake: the subjects 
mistakenly think that they are not influencing the outcome when they are.
Further cases of apparently perverse self-signalling need not involve mistake; indeed they may 
be quite rational. The awareness that the attempt may give evidence about the likelihood of 
success can itself be a reason to avoid the attempt, or to do something to interfere with the 
attempt so that it provides no evidence: if you fear that the evidence will be bad, you may not 
want it. This seems to be part of the motivation involved in cases of self-handicapping.8 A 
student might deliberately fail to revise for an examination; worse, they might get horribly 
drunk the night before, staggering into the exam hall late and hung-over. The behaviour looks 
irrational yet there might be purpose. They might be trying to avoid evidence that they would 
still do badly even if they worked as hard as they could. If there is any mistake here it is 
indirect. They may be protecting a mistaken belief about how good they could be if they 
worked; or they may be mistaken in their assessment of why they failed to revise or got drunk. 
I suspect that it is these features that make the behaviour seem perverse. However, neither of 
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these is essential to the case. If there is full realization of what is going on, then, while their 
preference for ignorance in a case like this may be unusual, it seems perfectly rational. 
What is essential to the cases that do involve mistake? The crucial thing is that the signal and 
the target feature need to be distinct. The state of being elect is quite distinct from that of 
performing good works; that is how good works can fail to provide evidence for election. 
Conversely, if the signal actually constitutes the target feature mistake is not possible. If 
someone’s consistently brave actions are motivated, in part or entirely, by a desire for assurance 
that they are brave, then that doesn’t seem to disqualify them as brave, since there is nothing 
more to bravery than being brave. We might unfavourably contrast such self-conscious bravery 
with a purer kind; but it is still bravery. Other cases are more controversial. Consider 
apparently moral behaviour that is motivated by the desire to know that one is moral. Is that 
moral? Kant would have said no, since the motivation is heteronomous. But it is far from 
obvious that he is right. A desire to look good in one’s own eyes can be a powerful motivator; 
we might hesitate before saying that it is bound to be self-defeating.9
The state of being elect is radically distinct from the performance of good deeds. But there is a 
lesser distinction that might be drawn between signal and target that is still enough for 
mistake. Even if the signal constitutes the current target behaviour, it might be being used as 
evidence that the behaviour will continue. Brave behaviour now may be taken as evidence of 
brave behaviour in the future. So once again the possibility of error opens up. Brave behaviour 
now might be no indicator of brave behaviour in the future, especially if the motivation to 
prove that one is brave is unlikely to endure.
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Tirole ).
. ADDICTION
We turn now to addiction. The view that I will be assuming, based on the work of Berridge 
and Robinson, takes addiction to involve a disruption of the wanting system. The background 
idea, at least as I understand it, is this.10 Human beings have evolved to have a system that 
enables us to form intrinsic desires for things that we have liked, or otherwise benefitted from, 
in the past. So, having sampled a certain foodstuﬀ, and having found it tasty, or perhaps 
nutritious in some other way, we now have an intrinsic desire for it, triggered by the sight or 
smell of it, or some other cue that we have associated with consuming it in the past. Crucially 
these intrinsic desires work independently of our beliefs and other desires. In addition to the 
intrinsic desire for the food, we might have a belief that eating it will give us pleasure, and a 
desire for pleasure, and hence an instrumental desire to eat it. But we do not need to have this 
in order to eat it; the intrinsic desire, triggered by the cue, will do that on its own.
These acquired intrinsic desires are controlled by the mesolimbic dopamine system. Addictive 
drugs act directly on this system, by boosting the release of dopamine, inhibiting its re-uptake, 
or something similar. The eﬀect is that consumption of the drug, at least in individuals who are 
susceptible, will give rise to an intrinsic desire for it, independently of any pleasure that it 
might bring; this will tend to give rise to increased consumption, which will further strengthen 
the desire, and a vicious cycle will have been started.
If that were all there were to the story then things would look grim for addicts. Moved by their 
intrinsic desires, they would tend to go on consuming unless they succeeded in generating an 
even stronger desire to resist. Generating such a desire would be unlikely. It is true that when 
the addictive desires are not stimulated by the relevant cue, an addict might have a stronger 
desire to give up. But once they are in the presence of the cue, the addictive desire, whose 
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10 For a much fuller account, along with references to the original research, see (Holton and Berridge ).
strength will have been boosted by each previous act of consumption, will attain the status of a 
craving, crowding out rival desires.
Luckily though this is not all there to the story. We have also evolved a capacity for self-
control. Quite how this works—how much it is like a muscle—is currently a matter of some 
controversy. All I need here is the idea that self control can work to rein in the kinds of 
intrinsic desires that are generated in addiction. 
There is a great deal of empirical support for this claim. The use of such self-control is hard 
work though. Once an addictive desire has got going—the best thing is to avoid them in the 
first place by avoiding the cues, or by generating habitual patterns of activity that serve to block 
them—then resisting it by the force of self-control is physiologically arousing and aversive. It 
requires eﬀort and focus; it is easily by undermined by distraction, stress and fatigue. So if an 
agent is going to deploy their self-control, they need to be very motivated to do so: they need to 
think that the rewards of success will be great; and that the chance of success will be 
substantial.
It seems that much of the eﬀort that is needed here involves a certain kind of mental control. 
Studies on delayed gratification—where an agent is oﬀered something fairly good 
straightaway, but something much better if they wait—suggest that subjects do best if they 
succeed in keeping their minds from reopening the question. Children in Walter Mischel’s 
famous marshmallow experiments—where they are oﬀered one marshmallow now, or two if 
they wait; or, better for our purposes, less preferred chewing gum now, or marshmallow if they 
wait—do better if they can see neither the reward for succumbing nor the reward for waiting. 
Seeing either, and hence being nudged again into opening up the question of whether waiting 
is worthwhile, makes them more likely to succumb. Likewise, dieters who use resolutions to 
successfully resist eating, find that the eﬀectiveness of these resolutions is completely 
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undermined if they reflect on why they are resisting at the moment of temptation, and hence 
open the question of whether they need to resist in this particular case (Wieber et al. 2014). 
Other research has shed some light on one of the mechanisms at work here. It transpires that, 
as the period of waiting goes on, so the children’s evaluation of the thing that they are waiting 
for goes down; so by the time they succumb they think it barely worth waiting for. Call this a 
judgment shift.11
There are two ways of thinking about agents’ judgment shifts. The first is as a response to a 
prediction that they will succumb. Here it works as a cognitive dissonance mechanism. 
Anticipating failure, agents tell themselves a story that makes their behaviour look better. The 
obvious thing to say is that the gap between the more preferred option and the less preferred  
is not so great after all. The second way of thinking about judgment shift gives it a more active 
role in the behaviour. It is not that desire directly drives the agent to succumb, and then belief 
falls into place to accommodate it. It is rather than desire works through the belief: it changes 
the belief, and it is because of that that the agent succumbs.
It would not be an easy task to tell these two apart. In fact they may well both be present in 
many cases. We know in general that beliefs that arise from a cognitive dissonance mechanism 
typically go on to have behavioural eﬀects: aware of their own behaviour, agents tell stories to 
make themselves look better, and then go on to act in accord with those stories. But the same 
can presumably happen before any action takes place: thinking that they might succumb, the 
agent preemptively increases the value placed on succumbing by a little bit; this in turn 
increases their estimate that they will succumb, which causes the value to rise a little further, 
and so on, until succumb they do. 
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Could it be that addicted agents are vulnerable to judgment shift of this kind? It is possible, 
but it is unlikely that it happens in the most straightforward way. The empirical evidence 
suggests that judgment shift only happens when the gap between the two goods is relatively 
small. It is easy to see why. It is easy enough for children to convince themselves that a 
marshmallow is not really any better than a piece of chewing gum. But suppose that the 
comparison were between a piece of chewing gum and a whole box of chocolates; or a piece of 
chewing gum and a bicycle. That would be so implausible that the method of judgment shift 
would not be available.
I suspect that the same is true of addicts. It is possible that some addicts, tempted by their 
drug, would conclude that, contrary to their earlier judgments, a life of continued addiction, 
with all of the damage to self and loved ones that goes with it, is actually better than a life oﬀ 
drugs. Denial of various forms is widespread in addiction—witness Hanna Pickard’s 
discussion—and this may seem to be part of that package. But I doubt that it is very common. 
It is certainly not what one typically hears from the addicts themselves. Much more plausible is 
a more subtle strategy. Giving up is indeed better than addiction, but. And then the but gets 
filled in various diﬀerent ways: but they are not in fact addicted, so can go on consuming in a 
controlled way that will not be damaging; but they do not need to give up now, since they can 
give up tomorrow; but the addiction is so powerful that there is nothing they can do about it. 
These strategies will be much more plausible if some evidence can be given for them. It is here 
that self-signalling comes in.
. ADDICTION AND SELF-SIGNALLING
We saw earlier that self-signalling involves a signal and a target feature; and that the possibility 
of mistake, and of the perverse use of signalling, can open up when these two are distinct. So 
let’s start by looking at the states that play these roles in addiction.
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On the signal side there are two obvious candidates. First, addicts look to their behaviour: do 
they manage to resist on certain occasions, or do they succumb? Second, they look to how they 
feel during this behaviour: is resistance hard work, or is it easy?
Which target features are being looked for? Could the target be entirely constituted by the 
signal itself? Maybe sometimes that will be the case. A smoker might want to renounce one 
particular cigarette just to show that they can renounce that very cigarette. But that is unlikely 
to be terribly interesting in itself. More interesting is the idea that renouncing one cigarette 
shows something about their future behaviour—that they could renounce any future cigarette
—or, more interesting still, it shows that they are not addicted to cigarettes. 
This last idea requires a conception of addiction which holds it to be a feature which explains, 
but is distinct from, the addictive behaviour: a deep-self feature, as we shall say. At one extreme, 
Alcoholics Anonymous teaches that alcoholics will remain alcoholics, even if they cease 
drinking. A deep-self view of addiction needn’t be as strong as that. It may simply be the view 
that if you are an addict, something has changed in you which makes it hard to give up—
harder than if you liked the drugs to the same degree but were not an addict—and that this 
feature explains your behaviour. Such a view is entailed by the Berridge and Robinson account 
of addiction that was discussed in the last section. Indeed, this view may be combined with the 
thought that the addiction is in fact in tension with some other aspects of the deep self. Much 
anti-smoking therapy exploits the idea that those who smoke may not really be, according to 
their own self image, smokers. Subjects can simultaneously think that some deep feature—
addiction—is leading them to act against other deep features of their natures.12 
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12 I am thus rather liberal here on what will count as features of the deep self: I certainly don’t require that they 
involve only what the agent judges best, or wants to want, or cares most about. It may be that we need a rather 
more restricted notion along these latter lines to do other work. For discussion see (Sripada unpublished).
Indeed, some deep-self view is almost universal across diﬀerent accounts of the nature of 
addiction; the only accounts which may reject it are very pure rational choice accounts, which  
see addiction as driven solely by desire, and then understand desire in terms of revealed 
preference. On such an account, it is hard to see that there is anything about which the 
behaviour could be misleading. But on pretty much any other view, the possibility of a perverse 
use of signalling opens up. How might this happen?
Let us imagine an agent who is starting to be concerned about their drug use. They might 
simply be concerned that the drugs are damaging them to an extent that outweighs any benefit 
that they bring; this may be enough to motivate them to give up. But their concern might be 
more complicated than that. They might be concerned, first and foremost, that they are 
addicted. Why should this matter? It could be intrinsically worrisome. Addiction, the agent 
might think, brings a loss of autonomy and self-control, which would be bad in itself. Or it 
could be instrumentally worrisome. Addiction, they might think, entails that if they ever do 
need to reduce their drug usage, they will be unable to do so. So even if they are not concerned 
about their current drug use, they might be motivated to stop using the drugs in order to break 
the addiction.
So let us suppose then that our agent becomes motivated to try to give up. An initial question 
is: When? Part of the problem of addiction is that, while any benefits are immediate, the costs 
typically accumulate gradually. There is rarely a pressing need to give up now; tomorrow is 
soon enough. This, I suspect, is one of the biggest obstacles for successful quitting; as evidence 
of that, note how much better people do when given an artificial incentive to give up 
immediately—a frequent urine test on which one’s job, or even just a small payment, 
depends.13 In the absence of this, a serious attempt to give up will often involve something that 
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13 For the first of these see (Heyman , p. –); for evidence of eﬀective contingency management policies 
that pay former addicts with a small monetary reward that increases each time they give a clean sample, but 
returns to the baseline whenever the sample shows drug use, see (Schumacher et al. ) and (Petry et al. ).
marks a certain time as special: a sudden jolt of realization of the state into which things have 
drifted; a jarring comment from someone whose opinion matters; or perhaps a self-imposed 
deadline for the implementation of a resolution, such New Year, or a birthday. 
Suppose then that our agent is motivated to give up now. But suppose that they are also 
sensitive to the evidence that the attempt to give up oﬀers; indeed, they may well be actively 
self-signalling, their actions partly motivated by a desire to gain evidence about their addiction. 
Giving up is not a single event. It requires multiple acts of abstaining (and perhaps some 
instances of backsliding) spread over a considerable time. There is plenty of opportunity to get 
evidence of the nature of the deep self. What could the outcome be? In the light of the earlier 
discussion we can identify various possibilities. 
The first possibility is that the agent finds the attempt remarkably hard. Perhaps they have 
already failed several times to avoid taking the drugs, and even when they were successful the 
process was horrible. On the basis of this information they conclude that long-term abstinence 
is unobtainable. The best they will manage is a temporary miserable halt; and if they are going 
to start consuming again, that will be pointless.
The second possibility is that the agent finds the attempt to give up remarkably successful. 
They manage to avoid taking the drugs, and they find this easier than they envisaged. We 
might expect that here at least the information given by their behaviour and their feelings 
would bolster the attempt, bringing confirmation that they have the capacity to take it through 
to completion. That is what we might expect given similar feedback at the start of an exercise 
programme; why should there be any diﬀerence here?
The diﬀerence, of course, is that in most cases our addict still has a powerful desire for the drug 
whenever it is cued. The attempt to give up may have been more successful than envisaged, but 
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it is still aversive and demanding. So they will be looking for something that gives them a 
reason to abandon it. And there are two obvious possibilities. The first is to conclude that the 
very success of the initial attempt showed that they are not really addicted. Perhaps they have 
been taking slightly more than was wise, but this is not a worry, since they now know that they 
can control their consumption—there is no deep feature driving it—and give up whenever 
they want. As one often hears smoker say: ‘I know I’m not addicted, since I have given up 
many times in the past’. The second possibility, not terribly diﬀerent to the first, is to accept 
that they are addicted, and that the this is something that needs to be overcome, but to think 
that the new evidence shows that this doesn’t have to happen yet since it can happen easily 
enough later on. This loses the idea that the behaviour is currently under control, but it 
maintains the thought that it could be brought under control whenever needed: I am addicted, 
but I can give up whenever I want. 
A third possibility follows what happened with the psychopath button. Our addict might infer 
from the diﬃculty of the initial struggle that they are addicted; might work hard to try to 
overcome the addiction; might interpret their success as evidence that they are not in fact 
addicted; might therefore allow themselves to go back to start consuming again; and might 
then interpret this as evidence of addiction all over again. This is not the steady state 
consumption of the earlier outcomes, but a move in and out of consumption that might 
happen on diﬀerent timescales depending on the individual.
In short then, if an addict has a motivation to continue consuming, they can read pretty much 
any signal as an indication that it would be right to do so. The situation seems utterly hopeless.
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. WHERE FROM HERE?
Of course, this conclusion is too hopeless. For we know that people do overcome addiction. 
They cannot always be caught in a trap of misreading the signals. So what happens when they 
are successful?
It could be that sometimes people read the signals more accurately: diﬃculty is read simply as a 
signal that hard work is required; ease simply as a signal that the addiction can be overcome 
straightforwardly. My suspicion though—certainly one in need of empirical support—is that 
this is not so common. I suspect that escape more often comes, not from reinterpreting, but 
from circumventing the self-signalling.
One way of doing that would be to give up on the idea that addiction is a deep feature. If there 
is nothing to be signalled other than the behaviour itself and the experiences that go with it, 
then no conclusions can be inferred about why it is futile or unnecessary. Admittedly there 
may be concern that if the process of giving up is diﬃcult, the addict will conclude that they are 
unlikely to stick with it; that requires no deep feature. But if the addict is succeeding in 
resisting now, that should count as good evidence that they will have what is needed to resist in 
the future.
Nevertheless, I doubt that many addicts think in quite this way. As we have seen, addiction is 
widely held to be a deep explanatory feature: popular culture points that way, as does the 
scientific consensus. Even if it would benefit addicts to come to believe that addiction is not a 
deep feature that they possess, it seems unlikely that they would manage to do so. So if they 
are to avoid the influence of corrupt self-signalling, they will need another approach.
Given what we know about how to resist temptation in other contexts, I suggest that the best 
approach is simply to ignore any signals. Just as the children maintained their resolve to hold 
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out for marshmallows by refusing to reconsider their resolutions, so addicts successfully give 
up by refusing to reconsider theirs, despite any apparent information that they may receive. 
Self-signalling is likely to be a corrupt source, though it will not seem that way under the 
power of temptation. Addicts should resolve to ignore it from the outset.
For some idea of how this might work, let us look again to those Christians who accept 
predetermination of election. Through the late th and early th centuries there was 
increasing concern amongst English Puritans as to whether the elect could gain assurance of 
their election. Such assurance had been a central tenet for both Luther and Calvin, and had 
been a key feature in their break from the Catholic church. But as the Puritans became more 
aware of the possibilities of self-deception, so they became more concerned about the practical 
realities of achieving it. As Daniel Dyke puts the position in The Mystery of Selfe-Deceiving 
():
Onely God of himselfe exactly knoweth the secrets of the heart. There is a great mingle-mangle 
and confusion of thoughts, even as there is of drosse and good metall in silver and gold, which 
lie so confused together, that to the eye of man the drosse is not discernable. ()
The Reformed churches never went so far as to deny that the elect could achieve assurance 
from careful introspection. Dyke listed a set of tricks that the flesh—the ‘olde foxe’— was 
likely to use to cover its tracks; by being aware of these, and by plowing with ‘God’s Heifer’, 
assurance could be gained, although it was not guaranteed (Dyke , p. ; p.). The 
Puritan position is well summarized in the Westminster Confession:
This infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence of faith but that a true believer may 
wait long and conflict with many diﬃculties before he be partaker of it: yet, being enabled by 
the Spirit to know the things which are freely given him of God, he may, without 
extraordinary revelation, in the right use of ordinary means, attain thereunto. (XVIII )
Given the importance attached to assurance by the Reformed churches in opposition to Rome, 
we can see why this was never questioned. But if we look to those outside that tradition, we 
can see, along with the same focus on self-examination, a rather diﬀerent response to the 
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problem that was posed by self-deception. Pierre Nicole was a Jansenist, who like the Puritans, 
believed in predestination. He too held that our motivations will often be ‘obscured by the 
clouds of concupiscence’ in ways that cannot be penetrated, and he too was concerned with the 
kind of vigilance that is required if we are to achieve any kind of self-knowledge. But when it 
came to how to act, he took a rather diﬀerent tack.  Our actions should not be guided by an 
attempt to fathom our own motivations, or by responding to our internal states. Rather, our 
gaze should be outward. We should simply aim to perform the outward actions, which we can 
recognize and regulate, in accord with God’s will, with the hope that our internal motivations 
will come into line. 14 This is not an irrationalist response. Nicole thinks that we have good 
grounds on which to discern how it is that God wants us to act, and excellent reasons to follow 
him. It is simply that, by not trying to gain information from sources that are not open to us, 
sources that are likely to mislead, we will be more able to do what is right.
The case with addiction is not quite parallel. Here there may be times when looking inwards is 
revelatory—just not when in the grip of temptation. But in times of temptation the approach 
that Nicole advocated seems just what is required. If the aim is to escape the addiction, the 
focus should not be on internal states and what can be gleaned from them; it should not be on 
self-signalling.  It should instead be on the behaviour that is needed. 
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